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Abstract
In 2014, a major epidemic of human Ebola virus disease emerged in West Africa, where human-to-
human transmission has now been been sustained for greater than 10 months. In the summer of 2014, there
was great uncertainty about the answers to several key policy questions concerning the path to containment.
What is the relative importance of nosocomial transmission compared with community-acquired infection?
How much must hospital capacity increase to provide care for the anticipated patient burden? To which
interventions will Ebola transmission be most responsive? What must be done to achieve containment?
In recent years, epidemic models have been used to guide public health interventions. But, model-based
policy relies on high quality causal understanding of transmission, including the availability of appropriate
dynamic transmission models and reliable reporting about the sequence of case incidence for model fitting,
which were lacking for this epidemic. To investigate the range of potential transmission scenarios, we
developed a multi-type branching process model that incorporates key heterogeneities and time-varying
parameters to reflect changing human behavior and deliberate interventions. Ensembles of this model were
evaluated at a set of parameters that were both epidemiologically plausible and capable of reproducing
the observed trajectory. Results of this model suggest that epidemic outcome depends on both hospital
capacity and individual behavior. The model predicts that if hospital capacity is not increased soon,
then transmission may outpace the rate of isolation and the ability to provide care for the ill, infectious,
and dying. Similarly, containment will probably require individuals to adopt behaviors that increase the
rates of case identification and isolation and secure burial of the deceased. Given current knowledge, it
is uncertain that this epidemic will be contained even with 99% hospitalization rate at the currently
projected hospital capacity.
Introduction
The 2014 epidemic of Ebola virus in West Africa is an emerging public health and humanitarian crisis of
epic dimensions (WHO Ebola Response Team 2014). This epidemic originated in an outbreak in Guéckédou,
Guinea in December 2013. The Ministry of Health of Guinea and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were alerted
to clusters of an unknown disease with fever/vomiting/diarrhea and a high fatality rate on March 10 and 12,
2014 (Baize et al. 2014). Through human-to-human transmission, the virus subsequently spread to Liberia
(29 March; World Health Organization (2014e)), Sierra Leone (25 May; World Health Organization (2014f)),
Nigeria (22 July; World Health Organization (2014g)), Senegal (29 August; World Health Organization
(2014h)), and the United States (30 September; World Health Organization (2014j)). On 8 August 2014 the
World Health Organization declared the epidemic to be “a Public Health Emergency of International Concern”
entailing an obligation on the part of 194 signatories to participate in disease prevention, surveillance, control,
response and reporting (World Health Organization 2014i). On 6 October, the first transmission outside of
Africa was documented in Spain (Gulland 2014). As of 27 October, 13,703 persons are reported (but not
confirmed) to have been infected (World Health Organization 2014a) with a fatality rate for those cases with
known clinical outcome around 70% (WHO Ebola Response Team 2014). Due to widespread under-reporting,
the true number of cases is widely believed to be considerably higher.
Ongoing international support has included the shipment of large quantities of personal protective equipment,
diagnostic laboratory apparatus, and materiel such as vehicles; provision of medical and logistical advisors
from MSF, the US Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, and the World Health Organization, among
others; and the construction of new treatment facilities (UN-OCHA 2014). A range of further clinical
interventions, health policies, and aid are under consideration and at various stages of mobilization. Whether
these are sufficient to achieve containment and/or what further actions might extend their reach remain
unknown. Epidemic modeling provides a means for structured reasoning about such complex dynamical
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conditions, both with respect to the information contained in this epidemic’s history to date and prospective
opportunities for intervention. While several models of the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic have been
published, the majority of these are primarily aimed at estimating the basic reproduction number (R0), a
summary statistic that may be tremendously informative about the potential rate of spread and the magnitude
of vaccination required to achieve herd immunity (Fisman, Khoo, and Tuite 2014). Knowing R0 is less useful
where human behaviors – including both public health interventions (Farrar and Piot 2014) and avoidance
or denial in the community (Briand et al. 2014) – cause the epidemic to take a more irregular path. Two
models that incorporate more detail have been published. A paper by the WHO Ebola Response Team
(2014) proposes a renewal equation for the evolution of the epidemic through time, parameterized with case
reports collected by MSF. But this model, which focuses on the time course of disease and conditions for
transmission, does not account for role of transmission setting. The model of Meltzer et al. (2014) is more
tactical, but provides little analytical insight.
Here, we report on a model of intermediate complexity. Our goal was to produce a model that could be used
to guide policy recommendations. A supporting objective was to perform analysis of a range of scenarios to
identify how actions taken in the present may influence short and medium term proposects for containment.
The model comprises separate probability distributions for the number of secondary cases arising among health
care workers (HCW) infected in hospitals, non-HCW infected by hospitalized patients, non-HCW infected
during non-hospital nursing care, and non-HCW infected through burial practices. Infected individuals may
be treated in the hospital or in the home. Hospital treatment is assumed to result in reduced transmission but
is limited to a fixed number of available hospital beds. Cases in excess of hospital capacity are assumed to be
treated in the home. Only cases seeking hospitalization (whether capacity allows admission or not) are scored
as a report, separating the total number of cases (which is unknown) from the number of cases reported. In
contrast to the models of WHO Ebola Response Team (2014) and Meltzer et al. (2014), this model allows for
changing human behavior and epidemic interventions through time-varying rates of hospitalization, exposure
of health care workers, and secure burial. We use the theory of branching processes to derive an expression
for the mean number of secondary infections.
Here we report on the application of this model to the current situation in Liberia. We focus on Liberia for a
combination of practical and intellectual reasons. Practically, the international variation in both transmission
and response precluded treating the three countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea simultaneously.
Additionally, although the situation is uniformly urgent across the three countries, the speed of spread in
Liberia during late summer and early fall of 2014 suggest it is the country of greatest need, both with respect
to the number of persons at immediate risk of infection and as a probable regional “driver” of large-scale
dynamics. Intellectually, we found our modeling work to be facilitated by the consistent collection of data in
Liberia since late June with timely and disaggregated reporting, high level coverage in the American news
media, and clear plan for the expansion of hospital capacity.
Methods
Data
Data were obtained from situation reports issued by the World Health Organiasation and the Liberia Ministry
of Health. All situation reports were pulled from Liberian MoH website or United Nations Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) provided websites(reliefweb.int and humanitarianresponse.info).
When values had to be interpolated, data from WHO outbreak reports were used. For provenance and
reproducibility, we digitally entered our own data, which are available from the Dryad Digital Repository
at [URL/DOI TO BE PROVIDED]. Reported cases were scored as the sum of suspected, probable, and
confirmed cases.
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Figure 1: Weekly number of suspected, probable, and confirmed cases of Ebola virus in Liberia in the seven
days terminating with each date (blue bars) and daily cumulative reports (gray line); data from WHO
situation reports. Hospital capacity in Ebola treatment units (total number of beds in country, dark blue
line); data compiled from media and government sources.
A branching process model
Model
We developed a discrete time, stochastic process model for Ebola transmission. The model considers where
transmission occurs and who is infected as a result. This allows a minimal set of subpopulation differences to
be articulated that nonetheless reflect the major epidemiological properties of Ebola transmission, including
hospital treatment versus community care, transmission at funerals, and scenario-dependent transmission
risk differences during care-giving. The model comprises separate probability distributions for the number of
secondary cases arising from (1) health care workers (HCW) infected in hospitals, (2) non-HCW infected
by hospitalized patients, (3) non-HCW infected during non-hospital nursing care, (4) non-HCW infected
through burial practices. Infected individuals are considered to be treated either in the hospital or in the
home (Figure 2).
Specifically, our model supposes that transmission is comprised of five processes that result in 11 state
transitions (Figure 2). In the following description, numbers in parentheses correspond to labels in Figure 2.
• Persons treated in the community give rise to a Poisson distributed number of secondary infections
among community members at rate λ = Nq, where N is the number of contacts and q is the per contact
probability of transmission. To accommodate heterogeneity in transmission, λ may be taken to be a
random variable, in which case the number of secondary infections is negative binomially distributed
with an additional parameter, θ, regulating dispersion (1).
• Persons treated in the hospital give rise to a Poisson distributed number of secondary infections among
health care workers at rate λβα, where β is a multiplier for the additional contacts acquired through
hospitalization and α is a multiplier for the effect of infection control interventions (2).
• Persons treated in the hospital may pass infection to a Poisson distributed number of visitors at rate
λh (3). It is assumed that all deceased hospitalized patients are given a secure burial.
• Persons treated in the community recover or are given a secure burial at rate g (and therefore do not
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Figure 2: Structure of a model for human-to-human transmission of Ebola virus. Flow of transmission
is depicted through two generations of infection in a multi-type branching process model of Ebola virus
transmission. Grey panels show that infected persons may be treated in either the community (C, blue
paths) or hospital (H, purple paths). Community treated patients may give rise to secondary infections in
community members through nursing care (CM) or in the process of body preparation and burial (FNR).
Hospital-treated patients may give rise to secondary infections in health care workers (HCW) or visitors
(VIS). Infected persons may either be treated in the community or in the hospital at rates that depend on
the conditions under which the infection was acquired.
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give rise to any further secondary infections) and non-secure burial at rate 1− g, giving rise to a Poisson
distributed number of secondary infections at rate φ (4).
• Persons acquiring infection in the community (classes CM, VIS, and FNR) are hospitalized with
probability h (6, 9, 11) or remain in the community with probability 1− h (5, 8, 10).
• Infected health care workers are all assumed to be hospitalized (7).
These processes constitute a multi-type branching process. Branching process models allow for very flexible
specification of the distribution of secondary cases. Branching processes do not account for the depletion
of susceptibles at the population level, however, and thus are appropriate during the exponential phase of
epidemic spread and/or where spread is controlled through human intervention rather than self-limitation.
We believe these assumptions are broadly consistent with the currently prevailing conditions in West Africa.
Hospital capacity
In simulations, hospital treatment was assumed to result in reduced transmission, limited by the number
of available hospital beds. Patients seeking hospitalization in excess of hospital capacity were assumed to
be returned to the home for treatment. Only patients seeking hospitalization (whether capacity allowed
admission or not) were scored as a report, separating the total number of cases (which in reality is unknown)
from the number of cases reported.
Parameterization
To parameterize this model, we were initially guided by reports on the outbreaks of Ebola virus in Kikwit
(Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1995 (Bwaka et al. 1999) and Gulu (Uganda) in 2000-2001 (Oyok 2001).
Transmission (N , q, θ) and the effectiveness of infection control (α)
The attack rate in Kikwit was 9% among hospital workers (Tomori et al. 1999) and 16% among family
members (Dowell et al. 1999). The ratio of exposures to index cases in households was Nˆ = 173/27 = 6.4 for
27 different families. Assuming exposure was only within the family (so each secondary case had only one
exposure), we have qˆ = 0.16 (risk of transmission per contact). At Kikwit General Hospital, 37 of 429 workers
met the case definition for Ebola virus disease. A reported three cases occurred after the use of barrier nursing.
If we assume that these 3 were all in Kikwit General Hospital, then 34 health care workers were infected prior
to infection control. 110 out of 138 other hospital workers reported direct contact with an Ebola patient.
Extrapolating to the 392 health care workers who weren’t infected, we estimate the number of workers with
direct contact to be 110/138× 392 + 34 ≈ 346 yielding an attack rate of 9.8%. Of course, hospital workers
experience greater exposure than persons providing care in the community. Among 48 uninfected persons
with direct contact jobs at Kikwit General Hospital there were a total of 151 patient contacts (3.15 contacts
per worker). If this were representative, then we would have the relation 1− (1− qα)3.15 = 0.098, yielding
α = 0.20 prior to the implementation of barrier nursing and other infection control measures. Following
barrier nursing, 3 out of 110/138× 392+ 3 ≈ 315 health care workers were infected, yielding an attack rate of
0.95%. Using the relation 1− (1− qα)3.15 = 0.0095 we obtain α = 0.019 after the implementation of barrier
nursing and other infection control measures.
Hospital contact multiplier (β)
The parameter β relates the number of contacts in a health facility to those in a household and is expressed
as a multiplier of N . This value is chosen based on intuition and narrative reports. In general, we consider
values in the range 2 < β < 5 to be reasonable.
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Funeral transmission (φ)
Legrand et al. (2007) assumed that mean duration of death to burial was 2 days and estimated transmission
rates of 7.66 per week (Kikwit) and 0.46 per week (Gulu). Translating into average number of infections,
the number of secondary cases through funeral are estimated to be 2.18 and 0.13, respectively, assuming
S/N ≈ 1, where S is the number of susceptible individuals in the population and N is the total population
size. A value of 0 < φ < 3 is consistent with the routine finding that preparation of the body constitutes
a substantial risk factor and that this duty is performed by a relatively small number of people. We note
that this is not consistent with anecdotal reports of large numbers of persons being infected at a funeral. We
consider those events most likely to be exceptional. Parameter values of this “core model”" are reported in
Table 1.
Variable Value
Household contacts (N) 6.4
Transmission probability (q) 0.16
Overdispersion (θ) 1
Hospital contact multiplier (β) 4
Effectiveness of infection control (α) 0.019
Average number of secondary community cases from hospitalized patients (λh) 0.3
Average number of secondary cases from a funeral (φ) 2.18
Table 1. Parameter values of the basic branching process model for Ebola transmission.
Treatment facilities
From a range of reports, we compiled a time series of the operational Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) along
with estimates of their capacity, recorded as the number of patient beds available (Figure 1). Importantly,
many ETUs were regularly reported to be operating above capacity, typically by around a factor of two
(World Health Organization 2014b, Medecins Sans Frontieres (2014), World Health Organization (2014c)).
Additionally, the average hospital stay is around 6.5 days (WHO Ebola Response Team 2014), considerably
shorter than the 15 day infection generation. Therefore, throughout our analysis, we estimate the number of
patients potentially served by an ETU within an infection interval using the formula
s(t) = 2b(t)τ/σ (1)
where t marks time in infection generations, b(t) is hospital capacity in terms of the number of beds, τ = 15
is infection generation time, and σ = 6.5 is the average duration of hospitalization.
Secure burial rate
Non-secure burial (including body preparation and funeral ceremonies) is one of the key occasions for Ebola
virus transmision. The Liberia Ministry of Health and international partners have therefore sought to reduce
this mode of transmission through public education about the risk of exposure from deceased Ebola patients
and the mobilization of body retrieval and burial teams. It is likely, therefore, that there has already been a
reduction in transmission due to increased frequency of secure burial. For example, even during the interval
from 4 July to 2 September (prior to a potentially spurious downturn (World Health Organization 2014a)),
the cumulative reported number of cases shows a negative curvature on a logarithmic scale (grey line in
6
Figure 1). We therefore modeled g (a rate that is the sum of the recovery rate and secure burial rate) using
the time-dependent function
g(t) = γ1(1− 1/((t− 7)γ2)) + µ (2)
where t is measured in terms of infection generations and µ = 0.3 is one minus the case fatality rate, γ1 < 0.7
is the maximal secure burial rate, and γ2 governs the speed at which safe burials increase. This function
allows for the secure burial rate to increase beginning around 4 July, starts at a positive minimum due to
natural recovery, and asymptotically approaches a maximum at γ1 + µ, since we suppose that secure burial
and recovery cannot go to 100%.
Initial conditions
According to our data, there were 27 beds in ETUs in Liberia on 4 July. Based on the reported cumulative
case count, there were approximately 108− 30 = 78 active reported cases at this time. Using equation (1),
we estimated that 54 of the reported cases were under hospital care. Further assuming under-reporting by
a factor of 2.5 (Meltzer et al. 2014, Chan (2014)), we estimated that there were a total of 195 cases for
195− 78 = 117 unreported cases at this time. Together, these calculations imply that 54 persons were treated
in hospitals and 141 persons were treated in the community.
Other parameters
In general, we treat the hospitalization rate (h), secure burial rate (γ1 and γ2), funeral transmission φ, and
overdispersion (θ) as tuning parameters. The time scale of this model is defined with respect to infection
generations. To calibrate to calendar time, we assumed a serial interval of 15 days (WHO Ebola Response
Team 2014). To calculate hospital capacity, we assumed an average hospital stay of 6.5 days (WHO Ebola
Response Team 2014).
Plausible parameter sets
Guided by these crude parameter estimates, we then tuned our model to data from the 2014 Ebola outbreak
in Liberia. There were two waves of transmission in 2014 in Liberia. The first wave occurred in March and
April, comprised a total of 8 reported cases, and may have gone extinct in mid-May. The second wave began
in late May and was the origin of the vast majority of cases. However, reported cases between the end of the
first wave and around 4 July were irregular, whereas after 4 July there was a dramatic and sustained increase
in the number of cases for many weeks. Around 6 September, the smoothed average number of cases per
case (a model-independent estimate of Reff ) began to decline (not shown). The World Health Organization
Situation Report of 8 October indicates that this decline was probably due to a deterioration in reporting,
rather than a true decline in transmission. For these reasons, we focused our fitting on the interval from
4 July 2014 to 2 September 2014. In keeping with the time scale of our model, and to smooth over daily
variations in reporting, reported cases were aggregated to 15 day transmission generations (Table 2).
Date Cumulative cases Cumulative cases among health care workers
7/4/2014 122 12
7/19/2014 197 20
8/3/2014 498 64
8/18/2014 972 115
9/2/2014 1847 153
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Table 2. Reported cases and reported cases among health care workers during five infection generations of
the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa.
The parameters h, γ1, γ2, θ, α and φ were first tuned so that the median simulated reports of infection
among health care workers in the four infection generations between 4 July and 2 September and the median
simulated number of cumulative reports among non-healthcare workers at the same times were as close to
the reported values as possible (see Online Supplement). We further refined these fits by minimizing squared
differences on a logarithmic scale. We then used latin hypercube sampling to explore a parameter space
within +/- 25% of the tuned values. A parameter set was deemed plausible if the reported cumulative number
of cases and reported cumulative cases among health care workers were within the observed range of 500
simulations.
Forecasting
To forecast future cases under different scenarios for aid and intervention, we project cases and number
of persons seeking hospitalization from 3 September 2014 until 31 December 2014 (120 days) under five
scenarios:
1. Baseline. Transmission and hospitalization continue at current levels (hospital capacity of 601 beds);
2. Scenario A. Conditions improve due to the U.S. aid commitment of 15 September 2014 (hospital
capacity increases by 1,700 beds in Ebola treatment centers between 25 October 2014 and 28 December
2014 to a total of 2,301 beds);
3. Scenario B. Conditions improve through an increase in hospital capacity of 6,800 new beds (four times
the U.S. aid commitment of 1,700 beds), bringing total hospital capacity to 7,401 bed equivalents by 28
December 2014;
4. Scenario C. Conditions improve by increase in hospital capacity to 7,401 bed equivalents by 28 December
2014 and hospital admission rate of 85%.
5. Scenario D. Conditions improve by increase in hospital capacity to 7,401 bed equivalents by 28 December
2014 and hospital admission rate of 99%.
Initial conditions for these scenarios were derived from outbreak reports issued by the Liberia Ministry
of Health and World Health Organization. Specifically, on 2 September 2014 the number of persons per
infection generation that could be treated in ETUs was 1444. In this generation, the number of reported
infected persons was 1871− 972 = 899 for a total infection generation of approximately 2248. We assume
that, at most, the fraction seeking hospitalization (60.2%) was admitted, yielding 2248× 0.62 ≈ 1394 with
2248− 1394 = 854 remaining in the community.
Results
Model fit
Overall, 1,045 of 5,000 (20.9%) parameter sets were determined to be plausible. Mean values from plausible
parameter sets are reported in Table 3.
Variable Value
Hospitalization rate (h) 0.6
Overdispersion (θ) 2.2
Average number of secondary cases from a funeral (φ) 5.9
Speed of secure burial improvement (γ0) 0.6
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Variable Value
Average number of secondary cases from a funeral (φ) 6.0
Core secondary transmission rate (λ) 1.1
Hospital leakage (λh) 0.25
Table 3. Mean values of plausible parameter sets.
The fit of the tuned model to the cumulative number of reported cases in Liberia is shown in Figure 4. The
heavy blue line shows the cumulative number of reported cases. The plausible range of case reports given the
model is shown in yellow (95% prediction intervals). The plausible range of total cases, including unreported
cases, is shown in blue. The fit of the model to infection generations in health care workers and in the general
public is shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 3: The fit model for Ebola transmission in Liberia initialized on 4 July. The heavy blue line shows the
cumulative number of cases reported. The yellow region shows the model-predicted range of cases expected
to be reported given incomplete reporting. The blue region shows the model-predicted total number of cases
over the same time.
Effective reproduction number
Model-based effective reproduction numbers at infection generations between 4 July and 17 October were
calculated by evaluating the effective reproduction number (see online supplement) at the 1,045 plausible
parameter sets. The change over time in the range of plausible effective reproduction numbers is shown in
Figure 3.
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Forecasts and containment
Simulated trajectories illustrating the possible outcomes starting on 2 September assuming baseline conditions
are shown in Figure 6. The median projected total epidemic size by 31 December is 130,862 cases (inter-
quartile range: 44,560 to 396,706). The top panel shows the range of trajectories for 10, 450 simulations
distributed over 1,045 plausible parameter sets. An interpolation to project the daily number of persons
seeking hospitalization is contained in the online supplementary materials. Projected epidemic size by 31
December for all five scenarios is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Number of cases in each infection generation when transmission occurs at the baseline rate. Dark
blue lines show 100 stochastic realizations of the model. Shaded region shows 95% quantiles over 10, 450
realizations; x-axis is the final date of the infection generation, e.g., 17 September is for all cases in the
infection generation beginning 2 September.
Scenario A assumes that the Department of Defense (DoD) improvements to hospital capacity constitute the
main intervention against the continued spread of Ebola virus in West Africa. In this scenario, an additional
1,700 hospital beds become available between 25 October and 28 December at a rate of one 100-bed facility
every four days. This interpolation is based on media reports that the first DoD unit is expected to come
online on 25 October and that all units are to be complete by the end of 2014. Results suggest that an
initial downturn in cases is to be expected based on isolation, but that capacity will be outstripped by
the continuing rise in cases. These results are consistent with observations since 2 September (see online
supplement). While these results do predict a temporary downturn, they do not imply that hospitalization is
exclusively responsible for this trend. Particularly, public compliance with burial policies, actions taken to
increase personal safety, and deterioration in reporting may all also play a role. The median total projected
epidemic size by 31 December is 51,202 cases (inter-quartile range: 37,868 to 152,453).
Scenario B assumes that the main line of intervention will be further improvements to hospital capacity in
excess of DoD improvements in Scenario A. In this scenario, an additional 6,800 “bed equivalents” (which may
include Ebola Community Care units as well as other units) become available between 25 October and 28
December (including the 1,700 ETU beds from Scenario A). The outcome of this scenario is interesting because
it shows that improved treatment facilities are not enough to ensure containment (see online supplement).
As above, the increased availability of treatment slows transmission for a time, but the outbreak outgrows
capacity and takes off again. The median total projected epidemic size by 31 December is 51,260 cases
(inter-quartile range: 37,868 to 81,237). Thus, although the upper end of the distribution is reduced, the
median and lower end are similar to Scenario A, suggesting that hospital capacity is unlikely to be the limiting
factor after the DoD improvements are complete.
Scenario C assumes that improved hospital capacity is complemented by improved public compliance with
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Figure 7: Distribution of nuumber of cases by December 31, 2014 in five scenarios. Scenario A reflects increased
hospital capacity from US DoD commitment of 15 September. Scenario B assumed significantly increased
hospital capacity in excess of Scenario A. Scenario C reflects significantly increased hospital capacity and
increased hospitalization rates. Scenario D reflects significantly increased hospital capacity and significantly
increased hospitalization.
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recommendations. In this scenario, the fraction of infected persons seeking hospitalization is increased from its
baseline (a variable number around 60%) to 85% in addition to the increased hospital capacity envisioned in
Scenario B. The expected (median) outcome of this scenario is containment, although some parameterizations
cannot be contained by this strategy (see online supplement). The median total projected epidemic size by 31
December is 14,829 cases (inter-quartile range: 11,608 to 30,192).
Although the expected (median) solution to Scenario C is rapid containment with new cases peaking in mid-
December, this is not guaranteed. There are several plausible parameterizations for which the interventions are
inadequate. We therefore investigated a further scenario (Scenario D) designed to achieve containment. In this
scenario, the number of additional bed equivalents is again 6,800 and public compliance with hospitalization
is 99%. A majority of parameterizations result in containment (see online supplement).
Since containment is achieved by a majority of parameterizations of this scenario, we ran the simulation
until elimination in a majority of cases. The size and duration of 78% of simulated epidemics ending by
mid-summer are summarized in the online supplement. Panels on the left show the cumulative probability
distribution for outbreak size (top) and duration (bottom). The yellow band shows the inter-quartile range
while the median is indicated by a dashed line. Panels on the right show histograms of outbreak size and
duration from the 10, 450 simulations. These results show that if the epidemic progresses as envisioned by
Scenario D, the total epidemic size is expected to be ≈ 12, 285 (inter-quartile range: 9,205 to 22,984) with
elimination by mid-March.
Discussion
The transmission of Ebola virus in West Africa continues to give rise to high mortality and morbidity. Part
of the challenge in predicting the progression of the epidemic lies in the fundamentally different ways in
which transmission occurs: infection of hospital workers, community care givers and those preparing bodies
for funerals (World Health Organization 2014d). Additionally, the timeframe and effectiveness of increased
hospital capacity compounds the problem of prediction (Torjesen 2014), whether it is aimed at anticipating
demand for hospitalization or determining the level and speed of intervention needed to bring the outbreak
under control. Our approach was to represent heterogeneity in transmission and time-varying intervention in
a multi-type branching process model (Jagers and Athreya 1997) that offers analytic tractability, efficient
simulation and the flexibility to investigate a wide range of intervention scenarios. It is closely related to
sources of data; for example, stratifying cases into hospital-treated versus community-treated allows for
estimating under-reporting which is thought to be large for the current epidemic (Gomes et al. 2014).
Analytical insight, particularly the derivation of a reproductive ratio, is useful when parameter estimates
(such as the hospitalization rate) are uncertain, since the sign and magnitude of their effects on transmission
can be derived. Besides recovering a full expression for the basic reproductive ratio, simplifying assumptions
such as assuming that funeral-associated transmission can be reduced to zero, yield further understanding.
In particular, our model shows how the additional exposure to health care workers in a hospital environment
(β) combines with both the reduced transmission in that environment (α) and the hospitalization rate (h)
to determine when community (versus hospital) transmission will dominate (i.e. when 1− h > αβ). Such
formulas may provide “rules of thumb” to help guide infection control or could improve practical decision
making by regularly updating estimates of core parameters through surveillance within health facilities.
The approach we have taken to model parameterization is novel. A more familiar approach is to propose
a deterministic or stochastic model that is then fit by minimizing an objective function on the errors, e.g.,
sum of squares or negative log likelihood of the data given the model (Legrand et al. 2007). Statistical
interpretation of such models (such as hypothesis tests or confidence intervals) relies heavily on the parametric
specification of both the process model and the observation model. If the proposed models are not good
approximations to their respective contributions to the data-generating process, then these quantities may be
quite biased. Moreover, such models are ineffective when they are overparameterized. Our approach–the
construction of plausible parameter sets that are both epidemiologically sensible and can reproduce observed
properties of the epidemic–seeks to better understand the space of models consistent with the data. The
cost of this approach is that the results do not admit probabilistic interpretations, hypothesis tests, or
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the construction of confidence intervals. A byproduct is that the identifiability of parameters (which is
compromised by overparameterization) is no longer an obstacle to model construction and forecasting. If two
parameters, say a and b, are highly correlated (not simultaneously identifiable) so that either the model with
large a and small b or large b and small a are both consistent with the data, then the plausible set will include
parameter combinations with examples of both kinds (but not large a and large b or small a and small b,
say). It may be that these differences are in fact irrelevant to the eventual behavior of the model, in which
case the space of possible solutions will be small. Alternatively, it may be that these are just the parameters
that most substantially influence alternative outcomes, in which case the space of possible solutions will
be large. By seeking bounds on the range of outcomes rather than a unique causal story, the method of
plausible parameter sets avoids technical problems with model identifiability and more accurately emphasizes
the kind of uncertainty prevalent under emergent conditions while focusing attention on the property of most
practical interest: the possible future trajectories of the epidemic. In conclusion, we believe that the method
of plausible parameter sets is a good starting point for exploring entire families of models and for setting
bounds on the range of possible outcomes. It is a first step toward the construction of models for probabilistic
inference.
In this study, we have focused on Liberia, one of the worst-hit countries during the current outbreak. The
ramping up of hospital capacity in Liberia was dramatic during late August 2014, adding approximately
300 beds. Throughout September, that sustained effort led to an additional ~300 beds. This heterogeneous
increase in capacity over time was incorporated into our model. We investigated alternative hospital capacities
and demands in a set of plausible alternative scenarios. The best and worse outcomes of these scenarios vary
dramatically in the forecasted epidemic size. Median estimates are at around 130,000 cases by 31 December
2014 assuming a baseline scenario without increased hospital capacity. This is reduced to around 50,000
when capacity is ramped up to ~1,700. Further increases in hospital capacity reduce the upper bounds, but
not the median. If the hospitalization rate can be increased to 85%, median predictions are of containment,
with an effective reproductive ratio <1. In conclusion, this exercise suggests that in the absence of rapid
hospitalization of most cases, none of the proposed scenarios for increasing hospital capacity is likely to
achieve containment.
Branching process models use offspring distributions to simulate forward in time. Here, the offspring of an
infectious individual refers to the new cases generated from that infectious individual. This is the type of data
that is frequently reported, even during early stages of an outbreak. Models that require contact-tracing data
are complicated by the fact that there is uncertainty about whether contact is effective or not. For example,
how many “contacts” of an infectious individual that gets on a plane are sufficiently intimate that infection is
even a causal possibility? Ambiguities about the causal relevance of contacts of different kinds complicate
models expressed in terms of attack rates. By focusing on the empirical offspring distributions in various
transmission settings, one is able to build, simulate and analyze a model with the key epidemiological features,
and to investigate a wide range of mitigation scenarios. In our case, the result was a multi-type branching
process that separated the location that infection was acquired from the sites generating new infections. This
approach captures the behavioral aspects of transmission that are often lacking in models (Funk, Salathé, and
Jansen 2010). Awareness of Ebola in the community and public education mean that community-acquired
transmission is increasingly likely to lead to demand for hospitalization. While our methods are focused on
the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa, they apply to a broad class of infectious diseases.
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Effective reproduction number (Reff)
From the independence of the mixture components, we obtain the mean matrix for transmission generations
defined in terms of treatment location.
M =
[
Nqαβθ + hλh (1− h)λh
h(θNqg + (1− g)(Nqθ + φ)) (1− h)(θNqg + (1− g)(Nqθ + φ))
]
(1)
The two eigenvalues of this matrix are:
Λ1 =
1
2(Nq(1− h+ αβ)θ + (g − 1)(h− 1)φ+ hλh
+
√
((Nqφ(h+ αβ − 1)− (g − 1)(h− 1)φ)2 + hλh(2Nqφ(1− h+ αβ) + 2φ(g − 1)(h− 1) + hλh))) (2)
Λ2 =
1
2(Nq(1− h+ αβ)θ + (g − 1)(h− 1)φ+ hλh
−
√
((Nqφ(h+ αβ − 1)− (g − 1)(h− 1)φ)2 + hλh(2Nqφ(1− h+ αβ) + 2φ(g − 1)(h− 1) + hλh))) (3)
The dominant eigenvalue (Λ) is the long run growth rate of the epidemic and provides a threshold criterion
such that outbreak will grow if Λ > 1 and decline if Λ < 1. In this model, which ignores susceptible depletion,
Λ is always the effective reproduction number (Reff ) in that it is the average number of secondary infections
in a population comprised of community-treated and hospital-treated cases at its stable distribution. If
evaluated at t = 0, Λ may also be interpreted as the basic reproductive ratio (R0). A special case of interest
is the complete elimination of cases in the community generated by cases treated in the hospital (λh = 0). In
this case, the eigenvalues are Λ1 = αβθNq and Λ2 = (1− h)((1− g)(θNq + φ) + gθNq). Which Λ will be
dominant depends on the values of α, β, h, g, and φ, so that eventually either community transmission or
hospital transmission drives the persistence of the infection. Further insight may be obtained by inspecting
the case where funeral transmission is reduced to zero (φ = 0). Then, Λ2 = (1 − h)θNq. Community
transmission dominates in this case if 1−h > αβ. Note that where hospital transmission dominates (Λ1 > Λ2)
the elasticities of the parameters are identical. This means that proportional changes in each quantity have
identical effect (halving the contact number is equivalent to halving the effectiveness of infection control is
equivalent to halving the increased contact rate in health care facilities, etc.).
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Supplementary Figures
Figure 1 shows the distribution of five case classifications over the time period used for fitting. These are:
(1) number of health care workers infected (HCW), (2) total number of reported cases, (3) total cases, (4)
fraction of cases that were hospital-acquired, and (5) fraction of cases associated with funeral preparation
and burial. For (1) and (2), the red line corresponds to the WHO reported number during the interval. For
(3), the red line corresponds to total cases obtained by multiplying the number of reported cases by 2.5, the
presumed factor of under-reporting. Importantly, the number of funeral acquired cases is consistent with
anecdotes reported by Rivers et al (2014). The fraction of cases that are hospital-acquired is somewhat lower
than anecdotally reported. Figure 2 projects daily hospital demand (new patients seeking hospitalization)
according to the baseline scenario. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the range of trajectories and daily hospital
demand associated with Scenario A. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the range of trajectories and daily hospital
demand associated with Scenario B. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the range of trajectories and daily hospital
demand associated with Scenario C. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the range of trajectories and daily hospital
demand associated with Scenario D. Figure 11 shows the total epidemic duration and outbreak size for the
78% of simulations of Scenario D terminating in mid summer 2015.
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Figure 1: Cumulative reported cases in data (red lines) and model simulations (box-and-whisker plots).
The left three panels show results for health care workers, reported cases, and reported and unreported
cases (assuming 2.5 fold under-reporting). The remaining panels show the model-predicted distributions of
hospital-acquired infections and funeral-acquired infections.
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Figure 2: Daily number seeking hospitalization (bottom) when transmission occurs at the baseline rate. Inset
plot shows the median daily number of cases.
Date
N
ew
 c
a
se
s
Se
p 
02
Se
p 
17
O
ct
 0
2
O
ct
 1
7
N
ov
 0
1
N
ov
 1
6
D
ec
 0
1
D
ec
 1
6
D
ec
 3
1
1e+00
1e+02
1e+04
1e+06
Figure 3: Number of cases in each infection generation under Scenario A.
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Figure 4: Daily number seeking hospitalization (bottom) according to Scenario A. Inset plot shows the
median daily number of cases.
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Figure 5: Number of cases in each infection generation under Scenario B.
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Figure 6: Daily number seeking hospitalization (bottom) according to Scenario B. Inset plot shows the median
daily number of cases.
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Figure 7: Number of cases in each infection generation under Scenario C.
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Figure 8: Daily number seeking hospitalization (bottom) according to under Scenario C. Inset plot shows the
median daily number of cases.
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Figure 9: Number of cases in each infection generation under Scenario D.
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Figure 10: Daily number seeking hospitalization (bottom) according to under Scenario D. Inset plot shows
the median daily number of cases.
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Figure 11: Cumulative distribution function (left) and histogram (right) of the total epidemic size (top) and
epidemic duration in days after 2 September 2014 (bottom) in a containment scenario (Scenario C).
7
